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Executive Summary
As baby boomers approach retirement, individuals and
policymakers are increasingly concerned about retirement
income security.  Thanks to dramatic advances in life
expectancy over the last century, todayÕs typical 65-year
old man and woman can expect, on average, to live to
ages 81 and 85 respectively.  Perhaps even more impres-
sive, over 17 percent of 65-year old men and over 31
percent of 65-year old women are expected to live to age
90 or beyond.  Most people would agree with President
Clinton that increasing life expectancy is Òsomething
w o n d e r f u l . Ó1 Ho w e v e r, u n c e r t a i n t y about length of life
carries the risk that individuals may outlive their
resources and be forced to substantially reduce their
living standards at advanced ages.  
Fo r t u n a t e l y, financial products exist that allow indi-
viduals to protect themselves from this risk.  In particular, 
a life annuity is an insurance product that pays out a
periodic (e.g., monthly) sum of income that lasts for life,
in exchange for an up-front premium charge.  The pri-
mary appeal of the life annuity is that it offers retirees 
the opportunity to insure against the risk of outliving
their assets by exchanging these assets for a lifelong
stream of guaranteed income.
In the United States, the two primary sources of life
annuities for most retirees are the Social Security system
and employer-provided, defined benefit (DB) pension
plans.  The first and most important of these, the So c i a l
Security system, is facing significant future imbalances
that have led to numerous proposals for reform, includ-
ing supplementing or partially replacing the existing
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1 In discussing the future insolvency of the Medicare trust fund on June 29,
1999, President Clinton stated, ÒIÕve often said that this is a high class
problem. It is the result of something wonderfulÑthe fact that we Americans
are living a lot longer.Ósystem with an individual accounts program.  
The second of these sources, employer-provided
pensions, is undergoing a dramatic shift towards
d e fined contribution (DC) plans, in which over 70
percent of participants are not even offered a life
annuity as a payout option.  As the U.S. retirement
landscape shifts to one that places more emphasis
on self-directed accounts, it is important to con-
sider the impact of these changes on retireesÕ
ability to adequately protect against the risk of
outliving their resources.
This issue in brief summarizes a growing body
of research on the important role of annuities in
the U.S. retirement system.  This review yields fi v e
policy-relevant conclusions: 
¥ Inflation-protected life annuities should be a
central component of any retirement income system
that seeks to provide retirement income security.  
If individuals do not have access to annuities,
they must trade off two risks.  First, if they
consume too aggressively, they risk running 
out of resources.  Second, if they consume too
c o n s e r v a t i v e l y, they forgo consumption oppor-
tunities and thus have a lower standard of
living.  Life annuities simultaneously solve each
of these problems and thus offer substantial
b e n e fits to retirees.  These annuities should 
be indexed to inflation to protect retirees from
fluctuations and declines in the real purchasing
power of their retirement income.  Even a
relatively modest annual inflation rate of 3
percent will cut the real purchasing power of 
a fixed nominal income stream by 45 percent 
in 20 years.   
¥ Existing public policy towards private pensions
does not encourage annuitization of private retire-
ment resources.  Hi s t o r i c a l l y, most employees
covered by pension plans were participants in
d e fined benefit plans.  According to federal law,
these plans must Òprovide systematically for the
payment of definitely determinable benefits to 
[a fi r mÕs] employees over a period of years,
usually for life, after retirement,Ó2 a requirement
that is typically met by paying benefits as an
a n n u i t y.  In contrast, defined contribution plans,
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most notably including the fast-growing 401(k)
plans, are under no such obligation to pay bene-
fits as a life annuity, or even to offer participants
the option to annuitize.  As a result, over 70
percent of 401(k) plan participants lack a payout
option that insures them against longevity risk.  
¥ The existing Social Security system is currently
the only meaningful source of inflation-indexed
annuities for most U.S. households, although the
recent introduction of indexed government bonds
should allow private insurance companies to off e r
these products in the future.  Social Se c u r i t y
b e n e fits are indexed to the Consumer Price
Index, and thus protect the purchasing power 
of retiree benefits.  Defined benefit plans, on
the other hand, rarely index benefits, and most
individually-purchased annuities provide a level
nominal payout for life, thus subjecting retirees
to significant inflation risk.  Ho w e v e r, the
availability since 1997 of Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities (TIPS) now provides private
insurance companies with an inflation-linked
asset with which to underwrite inflation-indexed
annuities.  While a significant market in infla-
tion-indexed annuities has so far failed to
emerge, such a market could develop if pension
or Social Security reforms stimulated suffi c i e n t
demand for these products.  
¥ Individual Accounts proposals for reforming
Social Security should consider mandating a
minimum amount of annuitization in order to
minimize old-age poverty and reliance on means-
tested government programs.  In the absence of 
an annuity mandate, retirees who choose not 
to annuitize would not be protected against
longevity risk, thus increasing the likelihood
that these individuals will run out of money
before they die.  In order to avoid rising poverty
rates among the elderly and increased reliance
on Supplemental Security Income or other
similar programs, some level of mandatory
annuitization is desirable.  The annuity mandate
would also need to consider the income security
of spouses.  One approach is to mandate the use
of joint-and-survivor annuities that continue to
pay benefits to a surviving spouse.
2 Treasury Regulation Section 1.401-1(b)(1)(i).¥ Because an annuity mandate may have
undesirable distributional effects, policymakers 
1) should be careful not to over-annuitize house-
holds beyond an amount sufficient to prevent
p o v e r t y; and 2) may wish to consider policies to
o ffset the redistribution. Mandatory annuitization
can result in substantial redistribution due to
the fact that lower-income people tend to die
younger than higher-income people.  As such,
these implicit financial transfers are often away
from economically disadvantaged groups and
towards groups that are better off fi n a n c i a l l y.
This is true in any mandatory annuitization
system, including the current Social Se c u r i t y
system.  Ho w e v e r, the progressive benefi t
structure of Social Security is largely effective 
at offsetting this reverse redistribution.  An
individual accounts system can also address 
the redistribution problem directly through a
progressive benefit structure or a system of
government matching contributions, although
not all proposals consider this issue.  Impor-
t a n t l y, other methods of reducing redistribution,
such as offering period certain guarantees (which
provide additional payments to a beneficiary if
the insured individual dies shortly after annui-
tization), often do so at the cost of reduced
insurance provision.
In the coming years, policymakers in the United
States will be faced with many decisions that will
impact the nationÕs public and private retirement
income systems.  Numerous proposals exist to
address the financial stability of the Social Se c u r i t y
system, and many of these proposals call for 
some form of individual accounts.  While many
economic and political issues are relevant to this
debate, it is important not to forget that one essen-
tial element of ensuring lifelong, retirement
income security is to provide adequate insurance
against the financial risks of longevity.  Re g a r d l e s s
of whether Social Security in the year 2050 more
closely resembles the existing system or an indivi-
dual accounts system, the provision of inflation-
protected, annuitized income should continue to
play a central role.
3Introduction
The United States is in the midst of an important
s h i ft in how individuals fund their retirement.
While the Social Security system continues to be
the primary source of retirement income for most
households, in recent years there have been many
calls for major reform.  Among the proposals are
many that would supplement or partially replace
the existing program with a system of individual
accounts.  If such a proposal is adopted, it will in
many ways simply mirror the dramatic shift that
has already occurred with private pensions over 
the past quarter century.  Since the passage of The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974, the U.S. pension landscape has
dramatically altered from one in which most
retirees received life annuities through defi n e d
b e n e fit pension plans, to a system of defi n e d
contribution plans (such as 401(k) plans) in which
individuals have more control over the disposition
of these assets.  
While defined benefit (DB) plans, including
the current Social Security system, and defi n e d
contribution (DC) plans, including proposals for
individual accounts, differ in many ways, one of
the most important differences is the method of
distributing retirement income.  Social Se c u r i t y
and most traditional DB plans pay benefits in the
form of a (possibly joint) life annuity and thus
provide retirees with a form of insurance against
outliving their resources.  This longevity insurance
is quite valuable to consumers, as it provides a
higher sustainable level of consumption than is
available in its absence.  The majority of workers
covered by private DC pension plans, in contrast,
are not even offered an annuitization option.  
And while many individual accounts proposals to
reform Social Security would mandate some form
of annuitization, this provision is not universal.
While alternative distribution mechanisms, such
as lump-sum payments or periodic withdrawals,
offer retirees a high degree of flexibility, they fail to
provide a formal mechanism by which individuals
can insure against longevity risk.  
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The extent to which individuals insure their
mortality risk has a number of important policy
implications.  First, by providing a guaranteed mini-
mum level of income, annuities ensure that no indi-
vidual will outlive his or her retirement resources.
Second, the provision of a minimum income floor
directly impacts the extent to which retirees, and
elderly widows in particular, are at risk of falling
into poverty.  As such, the degree of dependence on
means-tested social assistance programs such as
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Me d i c a i d
will be impacted.  Third, because assets that are
annuitized are no longer available for bequests, 
the extent of annuitization can affect the size of
transfers to the next generation.   
This issue in brief begins with a brief dis-
cussion of how annuities work, and why they are
important to retirees.  It also discusses many of
the institutional features of annuity markets in the
United States, highlighting the fact that very few
individuals annuitize resources outside of So c i a l
Security and defined benefit pension plans.  It
then explores a number of reasons for this limited
annuity demand, followed by a discussion of the
b e n e fits and costs of mandating annuities.  The
b r i e f concludes with a discussion of the policy
implications for pensions and Social Se c u r i t y.
A Primer on Annuities and
Annuity Markets
What are Annuities and Why are they
Important to Retirees?
Annuities are generally defined as contracts that
provide periodic payments for an agreed-upon
span of time.  They include annuities certain, w h i c h
provide periodic payouts for a fixed number of
years, and life annuities, which provide such
payouts for the duration of one or more personsÕ
lives.  This issue in brief is primarily concerned
with life annuities, the principal insurance role of
which is to protect individuals against outliving
their resources.3
3 Annuities certain contracts, because they are paid for a fixed
number of periods regardless of the survival of the insured, offer
no insurance against outliving oneÕs resources. In order to understand the value of a life
a n n u i t y, imagine a 65-year old woman preparing 
to retire with a significant stock of accumulated
assets, in a world without the existing So c i a l
Security system or a defined benefit pension.  If 
she knew her date of death with certainty, it would
be a fairly simple exercise to optimally allocate this
wealth over her remaining years.  In the presence 
of uncertainty about length of life, however, deter-
mining how much to consume is a more diffi c u l t
calculation because she must consider two com-
peting risks.  The first is longevity risk, or the risk
that she will live significantly beyond her expected
life span and thus run out of money.  One way to
solve this problem is for her to consume very con-
servatively to ensure that she will not run out of
money even if she lives to an extremely advanced
age.  For example, if she consumed only the
interest on her wealth, and never consumed out of
the principal, she would never run her wealth to
z e r o .4 This approach, however, exposes the indiv-
idual to the risk that she will die with a substantial
amount of wealth left unconsumed.  In what sense
is this a risk? Because the unconsumed wealth is 
a lost consumption opportunityÑwere it not for
the uncertainty about length of life, the individual
could have consumed more in every period while
alive, presumably making her better off.5
These risks arise from the fact that there is
substantial variation in length of life.  Table 1
shows that an average 65-year old man in the year
2000 can expect to live an additional 16.4 years to
age 81, while a typical 65-year old woman has a life
expectancy of an additional 19.6 years to nearly age
85.  As the table illustrates, however, 12 percent of
men and 7.7 percent of women will die prior to
their 70th birthday, while 17.5 percent of men and
31.4 percent of women will live to age 90 or
beyond.  This highlights the significant uncertainty
faced by individuals in allocating their retirement
wealth across their remaining lifetime.
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Table 1: Remaining Life Expectancy and Probabilities 
of Survival to Selected Ages for 65-Year Olds in the 
Year 2000
M e n Wo m e n
Remaining Life Expectancy 16.4 years 19.6 years
Probability of Surviving to Age:
7 0 . 8 8 0 . 9 2 3
7 5 . 7 3 7 . 8 2 1
8 0 . 5 6 0 . 6 8 5
8 5 . 3 5 9 . 5 1 3
9 0 . 1 7 5 . 3 1 4
9 5 . 0 5 8 . 1 3 5
1 0 0 . 0 1 2 . 0 3 6
Source: United States life table functions and actuarial
functions at 3 percent interest for males and females born in
1935 based on the Alternative 2 mortality probabilities used in
the 2000 Trustees Report of the Social Security Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n .
A life annuity solves the retireeÕs wealth
allocation problem.  A life annuity allows her 
to exchange a stock of wealth for a guaranteed
stream of income that will be paid as long as she 
is alive, and thus removes the risk of outliving her
resources.  In addition, an annuity solves the
problem of the lost consumption opportunity by
providing the annuitant with a higher level of
income than she could receive in the absence of
annuitization, in exchange for making the receipt
of this income contingent upon living.  In short,
the provider of the annuity (i.e., the government,
the employer, or the insurance company) uses the
assets of those who die early to pay a higher rate 
of return to those who are still living.
4 In a model with finite-lived, egoistic consumers, the strategy of
consuming interest only is never optimal. However, even more
complex consumption rules that avoid running out of wealth
provide a consumption stream that is strictly dominated by
actuarially fair annuitization. Readers interested in a more formal
treatment can consult Yaari (1965); Mitchell, Poterba,
Warshawsky and Brown (1999) or Brown (1999). 
5 For the time being, this b r i e f ignores any desire to leave a
bequest to oneÕs heirs. As will be discussed below, strong
bequest motives will reduce the value of annuitization. To illustrate the value of an annuity more
c l e a r l y, consider two identical 65-year old men with
$100,000 of accumulated retirement wealth.  The
first of these men purchases an actuarially-fair life
a n n u i t y, which, with a nominal interest rate of 
7 percent, would pay the retiree $929.38 per
month for as long as he lives.6 The second of
these men chooses not to annuitize, but tries to
maintain the same living standard by consuming
$929.38 per month while alive, keeping the
balance of his wealth earning 7 percent interest.
The second man can do this for 13 years and 
8 months, at which time he would run out of
money with a 60 percent chance of still being
alive.  Without annuitizing, the 65-year old 
would have to consume only $623.85 per month 
(33 percent less) in order to avoid running out 
of money by age 100, and even then there is a 
1.2 percent chance of still being alive.7
For these insurance reasons, economists have
long viewed annuities as an important component
of any retirement portfolio.  In fact, the earliest
theoretical results suggested that life-cycle con-
sumers with an uncertain date of death should
annuitize a l l of their retirement wealth that they
wish to use for financing future consumption,
leaving un-annuitized only that wealth that they
wish to leave behind as a bequest.  Si m u l a t i o n
results using this model suggest that such hypo-
thetical consumers would find access to actuarially-
fair annuities equivalent to a 50 percent to 100
percent increase in wealth.  Na t u r a l l y, this theoreti-
cal model omits a number of important factors
that would rationally lead individuals to annuitize
less than their full wealth, such as other sources 
of uncertainty, a desire for liquidity and control,
and market imperfections, all of which will be dis-
cussed below.  Nonetheless, economic theory sug-
gests that a high level of annuitization, rather than
a low level, ought to be the natural benchmark.
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The Size of the Annuity Market in the
United States
By far, the most important source of annuity
income in the United States is the current So c i a l
Security system.  Once an individual claims a
Social Security benefit, this monthly income is
paid in the form of a life annuity.  Importantly, this
b e n e fit is indexed to the Consumer Price Index, so
that the purchasing power of this annuity income
remains constant.  In 1999, the Social Se c u r i t y
program paid out approximately $391 billion in
b e n e fits to nearly 45 million recipients.  While the
majority of this amount was paid out to retired and
disabled workers, a substantial fraction was paid to
dependents and survivors.
Private pensions represent the second largest
source of annuity income to U.S. households.
Tabulations from the September 1994 Health and
Pension Benefit Supplement to the Current Po p u-
lation Survey indicate that of the 17.4 million indi-
viduals over the age of 55 who were retired from
private sector jobs, 7.2 million (41.3 percent)
reported that they were receiving annuity income
from a private pension plan.  The mean annual
annuity payment for this group was $9,714, and the
total amount of annuity income was $70 billion.  
The overwhelming trend among providers of
private pension plans in the United States is the
switch away from defined benefit plans to defi n e d
contribution plans, such as 401(k)s.  One implica-
tion of this switch is a decline in the opportunities
for annuitization within the pension plan.  Fo r
example, in 1997, only 27 percent of 401(k) plan
participants had an option to choose a life annuity
as their method of distribution.  Lump-sum with-
drawal is the most common distribution option
available, followed by some form of phased with-
drawal.  Figures for other DC plans appear to be
similarly low.  As a result, over 70 percent of the
nearly 50 million defined contribution plan partici-
pants in the United States will be unable to with-
draw their retirement account balances in a manner
that directly protects them from longevity risk.
6 These calculations use mortality rates for the general U.S.
population as used in the 2000 TrusteesÕ Report of the Social
Security Administration. For a 65-year old in the year 2000, the
1935 birth cohort life table is used. It is assumed, for purposes 
of this illustration, that the maximum possible age of life is 
118 years. 
7 Some might argue that this overstates the value of
annuitization because the individual could simply invest his 
non-annuitized wealth in a higher-yielding portfolio, including
corporate equities. This argument is somewhat misleading, for
reasons that will be discussed later in this b r i e f. Outside of Social Security and private pen-
sions, the market for individual life annuities is
quite small.  In 1998, the American Council of
Life Insurance reported that there were 1.6 million
individual annuity policies in a Òpayout phase,Ó
meaning that the policyowners were currently
receiving benefits.  This figure actually overstates
the extent of annuitization in the individual
market, since some of these contracts are annuities
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certain rather than life annuities and because some
individuals may hold multiple policies.  Thus,
privately purchased individual annuities are trivial
in importance when compared to Social Se c u r i t y
and private pension plans.
The small size of the individual annuity
market may come as a surprise to anyone who has
heard about the dramatic growth in the market for
deferred variable annuities over the past decade.8
8 A variable annuity that is still in deferred status is similar to a
mutual fund in that an individualÕs contributions are invested in
a portfolio of assets. From an individual investorÕs perspective,
an attractive feature of variable annuities is that the returns on
these investments are tax-deferred until withdrawal. In general,
what distinguishes deferred variable annuity products from
mutual funds is that they generally offer some form of implicit or
explicit insurance, such as a guaranteed return of principal in the
event of the insuredÕs death.
Design Features in the 
Accumulation Phase
¥ Immediate versus deferred annuities:
Immediate annuities begin making payments
immediately after the payment of the
premium. In contrast, under deferred annuity
contracts, payments do not begin until some
date in the future. Deferred annuities oft e n
receive favorable tax treatment during the
accumulation phase, and there is no
requirement that these assets ever be
converted into a lifelong income stream. 
¥ Rates of return on deferred annuities: Wi t h
deferred annuities, payments will not
commence until some date in the future.
Prior to the commencement of payouts, the
premium dollars can be invested at a fi x e d
rate, or in a portfolio of risky assets in which
case it is known as a variable annuity.
Design Features in the 
Payout Phase
¥ Number of lives covered: Single life
annuities pay until the insured individual
dies. Joint-and-survivor annuities continue to
make (possibly reduced) payments as long as
at least one of the covered individuals is alive. 
¥ Bequest options: Many private market
annuities offer period certain guarantees or
refund options that provide some additional
payments to a beneficiary in the event that
the insured individual dies shortly aft e r
a n n u i t i z a t i o n .
¥ Type of payout: Fi x e d nominal annuities
offer payments that are constant in nominal
terms. Gr a d e d annuities increase at a pre-
determined percentage rate. I n f l a t i o n - i n d e x e d
annuities rise with the rate of inflation, thus
preserving the purchasing power of the
income. Va r i a b l e annuity payouts are linked
to an underlying portfolio of assets, and will
rise and fall according to a pre-determined
relationship with that portfolio.
BOX: TYPES OF ANNUITIES AVA I L A B L E
The stylized examples used in this issue in brief are representative of a product known as a
single premium immediate life annuity. There is, however, a much richer set of annuity products
from which retirees can choose. It is useful to separately consider the accumulation phase and
the payout phase of an annuity product. The accumulation phase is that period in which assets
are being set aside for future conversion to an income stream. The payout phase is that period
in which the individual receives income.For instance, in the individual annuity market,
variable annuities grew from only $2 billion in
annual premiums in 1988 to $49 billion in 1998.
An important distinction, however, is that nearly
all of these variable annuities are deferred annuities,
meaning that the contract owners are still in the
process of accumulating assets (see Box for
discussion of annuity types).  This issue in brief i s
concerned primarily with annuities in the payout
phase, known as immediate annuities, which are
currently providing a source of longevity-insured
retirement income.  The growth in the deferred
variable annuity market will be relevant for future
annuitization trends if these funds are routinely
converted into life annuities in the payout phase.
Ho w e v e r, there is no requirement that assets held
in deferred annuities be converted to a life annuity
at retirement, and existing evidence suggests that
little of this conversion is taking place.9
Thus, to the extent that households are insured
against longevity risk, it is done primarily through
Social Security and defined benefit pension plans.
Very few individuals appear to be purchasing
annuities with non-pension savings or with the
balances of their DC accounts.  It is thus quite
plausible that the continued shift in private
pensions towards DC plans, as well as some So c i a l
Security reform outcomes, could result in a
substantial reduction in the amount of retiree
wealth that is insured against longevity risk.
Whether or not this is a troublesome trend
depends in large part on why retirees do not
choose to annuitize more of their assets, an issue
that is discussed in the next section.
Why DonÕt More People Buy
Annuities?
While annuities feature prominently in economistsÕ
theoretical discussions of asset decumulation, 
most households are not choosing to buy annuities.
Why is the individual annuity market so small? 
Annuitization Through Pensions and
Social Security
Social Security and pensions are the primary
source of annuities in the United States, and repre-
sent nearly two-thirds of the wealth of households
nearing retirement (Mitchell and Moore, 1998).
C l e a r l y, having a substantial fraction of wealth in
this form reduces the marginal value of additional
annuitization.  The reason is that the benefits from
Social Security and pension annuities already pro-
vide a minimum level of guaranteed income that
cannot be outlived.  With these benefits in place,
an individual does not run the risk of running his
or her resources to zero.  Were the annuity
b e n e fits paid by Social Security to be substantially
reduced or eliminated, one would expect to see 
an increase in the demand for annuities in the
individual market.  The increase in private
demand, however, would likely offset the loss of
Social Security by less than dollar for dollar, due to
imperfections in the annuity market and decisions
by some individuals not to annuitize.  
The Pricing of Individual Annuities
The standard economic model that predicts high
levels of annuitization assumes that individuals
can purchase annuities that are actuarially fair.
Ho w e v e r, prices in the individual annuity market,
like prices in many insurance markets, diverge
from their actuarially-fair level for two primary
reasons.  First, insurance companies incur
administrative and sales expenses to underwrite
and market annuity products, and these costs, plus
some level of profit, must be captured in the pre-
miums that are charged.  Second, individuals who
voluntarily purchase annuities tend to live longer
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9 For more discussion, see Brown and Warshawsky (2000).9
1 0 Details of the MoneyÕs Worth calculation are available in
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) and Brown,
Mitchell and Poterba (2000).
1 1 Annuity payout rates are from The Annuity Shopper m a g a z i n e .
1 2 The data on the U.S. Treasury yield curve were collected from
Bloomberg Financial Markets for the same dates on which T h e
Annuity Shopper data were collected.
1 3 As defined by MoodyÕs Investors Service, bonds that are rated
Baa Òare considered as medium-grade obligations (i.e., they are
neither highly protected nor poorly secured).Ó The bond rates in
Table 2 were also taken from B l o o m b e r g on the same dates as the
annuity price quotes, and correspond to a Bloomberg bond
rating of BBB-2.
1 4 This report is formally called The 2000 Annual Report of the
Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
and Disability Insurance Trust Fu n d s .
1 5 Mitchell, et al. (1999) develop an algorithm that combines
information from the Annuity 2000 mortality table described in
Johansen (1996), the 1983 Individual Annuitant Mortality table,
and the projected rate of mortality improvement implicit in the
difference between the Social Security AdministrationÕs cohort
and period mortality tables for the population. This algorithm
generates projected mortality rates for the set of annuitants
purchasing annuity contracts in a given year. These calculations
use an updated version of that algorithm that incorporates the
most recent Social Security data. 
than non-purchasers.  As a result of this Òadverse
s e l e c t i o n,Ó insurance premiums must be set high
enough to compensate insurers for the fact that
they will have to make annuity payments for a
longer period of time.  As the annuity prices are
raised, some individuals with shorter life expectan-
cies may find that these actuarially-unfair annuities
are no longer attractive.  
The extent to which adverse selection reduces
the attractiveness of life annuities has been
examined in a number of empirical studies of U.S.
and international annuity markets.  A common
metric in these studies is the ÒMoneyÕs Wo r t hÓ
calculation, which measures the expected dis-
counted value of annuity payments per dollar of
premium paid.  A MoneyÕs Worth of 1.00 corre-
sponds to the case of an actuarially-fair annuity.
Values less than 1.00 indicate that the present
value of the annuity payments will, on average, be
less than the premium paid.  For example, if the
MoneyÕs Worth of an annuity is 0.90, this indi-
cates that the individual can expect, on average, 
to receive 90 cents in annuity income for every 
$1 paid in premium.1 0
To calculate the MoneyÕs Worth, one needs
information on annuity payouts, interest rates, 
and mortality rates.  According to an industry trade
p u b l i c a t i o n ,1 1 the average payout available to a 
65-year old male purchasing a life annuity in 
May 1999 with an initial investment of $100,000
would have been $734.77 per month for life.  A 
65-year old woman would have received $667.36
per month, with the difference attributable to
lower mortality rates among women.  
To transform these payment streams into a
present value requires selecting an interest rate.
One option is to use the interest rates that are
implied by the term structure of yields for U.S.
Treasury bonds.1 2 These are riskless interest rates,
and using them to discount future annuity payouts
implicitly assumes that no default risk is associated
with these payouts.  The argument for using such
discount rates is that insurance regulation makes
the default risk for annuity providers very low.  
In addition, annuity buyers in most states are
protected against insurance company defaults
through state insolvency funds.  While these funds
do not make all annuity purchases riskless, they 
do further reduce the chance that an annuity buyer
will not receive the promised payouts.  One can
argue, however, that riskless interest rates generate
discount rates that are too low, since life insurance
firms generally invest their portfolios in risky
corporate bonds.  Thus, Table 2 also reports results
using the term structure for Baa-rated corporate
b o n d s .1 3
Due to the fact that mortality rates of annui-
tants differ from that of the general population, it
is useful to calculate the MoneyÕs Worth using two
sets of mortality tables.  The first set uses survival
probabilities for the population at large, taken
from the birth cohort mortality rates used in the
Social Security Ad m i n i s t r a t i o nÕs TrusteesÕ Re p o r t .1 4
The second set of results acknowledges that annu-
ity purchasers tend to have longer life expectancies
than the general population.  As a result, insur-
ance companies have developed a second set of
mortality rates that describe the mortality experi-
ence of those who actually purchase annuities.1 5The population and annuitant mortality tables
differ substantially.  Figure 1 shows the projected
mortality rates in 1999 for 65-year old male
annuity buyers and 65-year old men in the popu-
lation at large.  Between the ages of 65 and 75, the
mortality rate for annuitants is roughly half of that
for the general population.  The mortality differ-
ential is somewhat smaller at older ages.  Because
cash flows in the first few years after annuity
purchase contribute importantly to determining
the expected present discounted value of the
annuity payout, the large mortality differential
between ages 65 and 75 generates signifi c a n t
differences in MoneyÕs Worth calculations when
switching from one mortality table to another.
Figure 1: Population and Annuitant Mortality Rates
Source: U.S. Population mortality rates from unpublished data
used in the 2000 Trustees Report of the Social Se c u r i t y
Administration and annuitant mortality rates from the Society 
of Actuaries (with some adjustments made by the author). 
Table 2 reports results of the MoneyÕs Wo r t h
calculation.  Using the population mortality table
and discounting using the Treasury rate, the
MoneyÕs Worth is 85 cents on the dollar for men
and 87 cents on the dollar for women.  This sug-
gests that 65-year olds can expect to receive 13 to 15
cents less in annuity payments than they paid as an
initial premium.  If one instead discounts using the
higher corporate bond rate, the MoneyÕs Worth is
reduced considerably to 78 cents on the dollar for
men and 79 cents on the dollar for women, sug-
gesting a differential of over 20 cents on the dollar.
Table 2: MoneyÕs Worth of Single Premium Immediate
Annuities Offered to 65-Year Olds, United States, 1999
M e n Wo m e n
P o p u l a t i o n A n n u i t a n t P o p u l a t i o n A n n u i t a n t
Treasury Rates 0 . 8 5 0 . 9 7 0 . 8 7 0 . 9 5
Corporate Rates 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 8 0 . 7 9 0 . 8 6
Source: AuthorÕs calculations.
If the MoneyÕs Worth is calculated using
mortality rates of typical annuitants, however, 
the ratios are higher.  Using a Treasury rate, the
MoneyÕs Worth is 97 cents on the dollar for men
and 95 cents on the dollar for women.  Therefore,
individuals with mortality expectations like 
those of typical annuitants appear to receive an
actuarially-attractive price, with only 3 to 5 cents 
on the dollar being attributed to administrative
costs of the insurance company.  The 10 cents on
the dollar difference between the MoneyÕs Wo r t h
using the population and the annuitant tables,
h o w e v e r, is a measure of the cost of adverse
selection.  This number is important, because if 
all individuals were forced into the private annuity
market with an annuity mandate, the adverse
selection component would likely disappear.  
This suggests that an annuity mandate might 
raise payouts by as much as 10 percent.1 6
Bequest Motives and Self-Insurance
Within Fa m i l i e s
If retirees wish to leave an inheritance to their
children or other relatives, then this desire would
reduce the incentive to annuitize at retirement.
With an ordinary life annuity, the value of the
annuity contract is zero upon the death of the
insured.  While a number of ÒbequestÓ options 
are available, such as guarantee periods or refund
options, generally the easiest method of providing
for a bequest is to annuitize only partially, and
leave some wealth in assets that can be inherited.  
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1 6 One would also need to consider whether administrative and
selling expenses would be different in a large, mandated annuity












1 7 Examples include Laitner and Juster (1996) and Bernheim
( 1 9 9 1 ) .
1 8 Examples include Hurd (1987, 1989) and Brown (1999a,
1 9 9 9 b ) .
The strength of bequest motives and their
implication for financial behavior of elderly
households are issues of continued debate in the
economics literature.  It is clear that many house-
holds do leave wealth behind to their children, but
it is less clear whether these bequests are inten-
tional, the result of poor financial planning on 
the part of the decedent, or due to limited market
options for annuitization.  Some researchers have
argued that the large magnitude of bequests, the
presence of life insurance in many household
portfolios, and the choice of survivor options in
pensions are suggestive of intentional bequest
b e h a v i o r.1 7 Still others have demonstrated that
couples with children do not behave in a manner
consistent with a bequest motive.1 8 Fu r t h e r
research is needed to resolve this debate.   
Risk pooling within families may be another
reason that people do not fully annuitize in the
formal insurance market.  Researchers have looked
at this effect in two ways.  First, one can think of 
a family as a miniature annuity market.  Annuity
markets operate by transferring the resources of an
early decedent to those who live for a longer period
of time.  Family members who share a common
budget essentially do the same thing.  For example,
if the husband dies with unannuitized assets, his
resources are not wasted, but rather are available
to his wife or children for consumption.  Obvi-
o u s l y, the ability to pool risks in a couple or a
small family cannot completely substitute for an
e f ficient annuity market with many participants,
but it can come surprisingly close.  In fact, simu-
lations suggest that a two-person household can
achieve just under 50 percent of the utility gains
that would accrue from an actuarially-fair annuity
market (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981).  A second
view is that the risk of both members of a couple
dying in any given year is obviously lower than the
risk of any one of them dying in that year.  Si n c e
annuity payments are inversely related to mortality
risk (i.e., an insurance company can pay more each
month when the risk of dying is higher), the extra
return that a joint life annuity provides is lower,
making annuities somewhat less attractive relative
to alternative investments.
The Desire for Flexibility
With few exceptions, the decision to annuitize
oneÕs wealth is largely irreversible.  The reason for
this is quite simpleÑif individuals had the ability
to cash out their annuity at any time, they would
always try to do so right before death.  This would
be a severe form of adverse selection, and would
make it financially impossible for an insurance
company to offer attractive annuity rates.
As a result of this irreversibility, individuals
who annuitize give up flexibility and essentially
impose a liquidity constraint on themselves.  In 
a recent survey, financial planning professionals
were asked why so few individuals choose to
annuitize.  Of 321 financial planners surveyed, 
31 percent cited the loss of control of principal 
or lost flexibility as the primary reason for low
annuitization rates, as shown in Table 3.  This
response is far higher than any other response.  
Table 3: Financial Planner Responses as to Why Fe w
Retirees Take a Lifetime Income Option (percent)
Loss of control of principal/Locked in 3 1
Want money to go to heirs/Loss of assets 1 8
Low payout 1 5
No adjustment for inflation 1 2
Better ways to make money 1 1
Poor advice/Not well-informed 9
Bad idea/DonÕt need it 5
Source: American Council on Life Insurance, ÒPositioning and
Promoting Annuities in a New Retirement Environment,Ó 1999.
P r e s u m a b l y, one of the main reasons that
individuals desire flexibility is that they are
uncertain about future expenditure needs.  This
uncertainty is particularly true with regard to
uninsured medical expenses, such as for prescrip-
tion drugs or long-term care.  For example, studies
have estimated that 35 to 40 percent of 65-year olds
will spend some time in a nursing home before
they die.  While Medicare will often pay for stays 
up to 100 days, many nursing home stays are of
longer duration.  Given the extremely limited
coverage by private long-term care insurance in the
United States, most expenses must be paid out ofpocket by the individual, or by Medicaid after the
individual has spent down his or her resources.  
It is clear that older Americans recognize health
care costs as an important source of financial risk.
Venti and Wise (2000) report results from the
Health and Retirement Survey question that asks
ÒIn thinking about your financial future, how
concerned are you with health care costs?Ó Fi ft y -
two percent of respondents indicated a high level
of concern, significantly more than are concerned
with other sources of uncertainty such as job loss
or financial market collapse. 
I n f l a t i o n
Outside of Social Security and a limited number 
of DB plans, most annuities in the United States
are fixed in nominal terms, meaning they do not
include any provision to protect the individual
against the risk of inflation.  Inflation has two
undesirable effects on fixed nominal annuity
streams.  First, even modest rates of inflation will
erode the real value of the income stream over
time.  For instance, at a 3.2 percent annual rate
(which is the average U.S. inflation rate over the
1926-97 period), the real value of a constant
nominal annuity will be cut in half in 22 years.  
If inflation were constant and expected, however,
this would easily be remedied by the use of a
g r a d e d or e s c a l a t i n g annuity product that increases
the nominal payout by a fixed percentage each
y e a r.  The second effect, however, arises from the
inflation u n c e r t a i n t y.  If inflation varies from year
to year, it will induce variation in the real
purchasing power available to retirees.  This is true
even if the product is escalating at a fi x e d
percentage rate each year.
In the United States, inflation-indexed
annuities are largely not available to consumers.
Hi s t o r i c a l l y, this scarcity was due to the lack of
inflation-indexed investments with which life
insurance companies could underwrite policies.
In 1997, however, the U.S. government introduced
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS),
which are inflation-indexed government bonds.
Since the introduction of these securities, two
companies have made inflation-indexed annuities
available to consumers.  TIAA-CREF, the principal
and longstanding retirement system for the
n a t i o nÕs education and research sectors, offers a
variable annuity linked to an ÒInflation Linked
Bond Ac c o u n t.Ó While this product does not guar-
antee a fixed real income stream due to several
design features,1 9 it does offer a very high degree
of inflation protection.  Ho w e v e r, this product is
not available to individuals outside of the educa-
tion and research sector.  A second U.S. company,
Irish Life of North America, offers a true CPI-
indexed annuity, but as of this writing they had 
no sales of this product.  It is unclear whether 
this lack of demand is due to unattractive prices,
poor marketing, or a genuine lack of demand 
for inflation-adjusted products.  If demand for
inflation-indexed annuities were to increase in 
the future, such as through a Social Security or
pension reform that mandated inflation-indexed
annuities through the private sector, the availability
of TIPS should enable life insurance companies to
meet this demand.
Outside of the United States, other nations
have more experience with inflation-indexed
annuities.  For example, index-linked bonds have
been available in the United Kingdom for two
decades, allowing insurance companies to offer
inflation-indexed annuities.  Even so, approxi-
mately 90 percent of individuals purchase level
annuities and do not opt for any sort of inflation
protection.  Part of the lack of demand may be 
due to the high costs; the MoneyÕs Worth of real
annuities in the United Kingdom appears to be 
8 to 10 percent lower than that of nominal
a n n u i t i e s .2 0 The experience of other nations, such
as Israel and Australia, confirms that the private
sector is able to offer real annuities, but at a sig-
n i ficant additional cost relative to fixed nominal
annuities.    
1 9 These features include: 1) TIAA annuities are ÒparticipatingÓ
and thus change value based on the mortality experience of the
contract owners; 2) the value of the underlying portfolio is
marked to market daily, and thus the value will vary; and 3) the
nominal portfolio return must exceed 4 percent plus the rate of
inflation in order not to decline in real terms.
2 0 See Murthi, Orszag and Orszag (1999) and Finkelstein and
Poterba (1999).
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2 1 For a detailed discussion of the equity premium, see Diamond
( 1 9 9 9 ) .
2 2 See Hammermesh (1985) and Hurd and McGarry (1995).
2 3 Even if an individual correctly estimates his or her life
e x p e c t a n c y, however, the degree of uncertainty about survival
rates will still affect annuity demand. For example, a person who
believes that they will die with certainty at age 85 may not desire
an annuity because, according to their subjective probabilities,
there is no longevity risk.
Higher-Return Portfolio Choices
It is sometimes argued that individuals can do
better than an annuity by investing the funds on
their own in higher-return assets, such as a port-
folio of equities.  The logic of this argument is that
fixed annuities are generally backed by bond port-
folios, and over the long term, stocks have histori-
cally earned a higher rate of return than bonds.2 1
This argument is misleading for two reasons.
First, even a well-diversified portfolio does not
insure a retiree against longevity risk.  Stock
returns are higher than bond returns on average,
but these returns come at the cost of increased
risk.  A recent study (Mi l e v s k y, 2000) found that
even with an optimally-chosen, diversified port-
folio, if a person tries to replicate the stream of
annuity payments, the probability of running out
of wealth is still significant.  
Second, an individual who wishes to invest 
in a more diversified portfolio can do so without
s a c r i ficing longevity insurance by purchasing
variable or equity-linked annuities.  Va r i a b l e
annuities invest the premium in an underlying
portfolio of assets, and the monthly payment from
the annuity rises or falls depending on whether the
asset returns are higher or lower than the A s s u m e d
Interest Ra t e that was used to determine the initial
annuity payment.  Equity-indexed annuities invest
a fraction of the premium (e.g., 90 percent) in a
fixed annuity, and use the remaining premium to
purchase call options on a stock index, such as the
Standard & PoorÕs 500.  With this product, the
individual is guaranteed never to receive less than
the value of the fixed annuity portion, but can
capture some of the ÒupsideÓ potential of equities
if returns are high enough.  Importantly, both of
these products preserve the longevity insurance
feature that the individual will continue to receive
payments for as long as he or she lives.  
Lack of Understanding of the Benefits
of Annuitization
A final reason that individuals may not choose to
annuitize is that they fail to fully understand the
b e n e fits of annuitization.  This could arise either
because they underestimate the probability of
living to advanced ages, or because they fail to
understand how annuities operate to insure
against longevity risk.  
The limited evidence available to assess sub-
jective survival probabilities suggests that, on aver-
age, these subjective probabilities behave a lot like
actual probabilities derived from life tables and
mortality data.2 2 Thus, while any given individual
may have an inaccurate assessment of his or her
mortality risk, the data suggest that people are just
as likely to overstate as to understate their survival
probabilities.  Based on these data, it is unlikely
that the lack of annuity demand is due to people
systematically underestimating their length 
of life.2 3
A more likely scenario is that individuals
simply do not understand how an annuity operates
or why it is beneficial.  A task force of the
American Council on Life Insurance has con-
cluded, based on qualitative consumer research,
that consumer knowledge of annuities is low.
Their report suggests that the least understood
aspect of annuities is how risk sharing can allow
insurers to offer lifelong income.  Co n s u m e r s
tended to focus on the risk of dying early and
therefore receiving less in return from the annuity
than they paid in, while overlooking the fact that
they may live longer than expected and receive
much more than they paid.  In fact, some con-
sumers equated lifetime annuity payments with
gambling on their lives and believed that the odds
in the gamble favored the insurance company.  
Unlike many of the other reasons that con-
sumers may not annuitize, a lack of understanding
of annuity products and their benefits is particu-
larly troubling.  While more research is needed to
understand the extent to which this explanation 
is true, one possible implication is that the lack 
of annuitization outside of Social Security and
d e fined benefit pensions should not be viewed 
as an optimal decision by all consumers.  If true, 
it would lend further support to mandating a
minimum level of annuitization.Spousal Considerations
While most of the discussion so far has focused on
individual retirees, it is also important to consider
the impact of retirement income policy on the
spouses of retired workers.  According to the
Census Bureau, in 1997, 79 percent of men and 53
percent of women between the ages of 65 and 74
were married.  Of those who were not married,
most were widowed.  These figures underscore the
importance of considering both spouses when
examining retirement income security.  
The Social Security Act requires survivor
insurance for spouses of workers covered by So c i a l
Se c u r i t y.  Surviving spouses generally receive
between half and two-thirds of the income that was
being paid by Social Security when both spouses
were alive.  In contrast, there is no requirement
that private pensions pay survivor benefi t s .
ERISA, the federal law governing private pensions,
only requires that pension plans that offer an
annuity provide a joint and survivor option that
pays the surviving spouse at least 50 percent, but
not more than 100 percent, of the pension received
during the joint lives of the husband and wife.
Couples can waive the survivor option only if both
spouses sign a notarized consent form.   
Sponsors of defined contribution plans are not
required to offer an annuity at all.  Ho w e v e r, if
they choose to do so, they are also required to offer
a joint and survivor annuity as the default option.
Some practitioners have argued that this additional
administrative burden is one reason that more 
DC plans do not offer annuities.  These costs,
h o w e v e r, must be netted against the signifi c a n t
social benefits of providing a guaranteed source 
of survivor income.
The major benefit of providing survivor income
is a reduction in poverty among elderly widows.
Between 1982 and 1991, for example, the median
value of inflation-adjusted income from private
pensions had fallen 23 percent for intact couples,
primarily due to incomplete inflation indexing.  
For households in which the wife became widowed,
the value of real pension income over this period
fell 75 percent (Coile and Diamond, 1998).  Becom-
ing widowed has long been recognized as a key
determinant of poverty rates among the elderly,
especially women.  Higher levels of survivor
b e n e fits could help address this problem.  
A retirement system that wishes to provide
meaningful income security, therefore, must be
especially careful to provide for a surviving spouse.
Should We Mandate
Annuitization?
One way to view the existing Social Security system
is as a government-mandated annuitization sys-
tem.  Individuals are required to contribute to the
system while working via Social Security payroll
taxes and are then required to take the benefit as 
a life annuity.  In the past, when defined benefi t
plans were far less likely to offer a lump-sum
option than they are today, employees of firms 
with these plans had little choice but to take their
pension benefit as an annuity.  In short, mandatory
annuitization has been the norm in the United
States for many decades.
Advocates of DC plans and individual accounts
applaud the broader degree of freedom that partici-
pants have to choose how to use their accumulated
accounts in retirement.  The absence of an annuity
mandate is thus viewed positively as a loosening of
constraints on individual choice.  
As is often the case, however, the question of
whether or not some annuitization of retirement
resources should be mandated involves a compli-
cated set of trade-offs.  The two primary benefits 
of mandatory annuitization are: 1) the potential 
to improve annuity market efficiency through 
the elimination of adverse selection; and 2) the
decreased risk that some retirees will fail to
adequately provide for their own consumption at
advanced ages.  Mandatory annuitization also has
two important costs: 1) some individuals will be
forced to over-annuitize relative to what is optimal,
due, for example, to poor health or strong bequest
motives; and 2) mandatory annuitization can have
undesirable distributional consequences.  In the
end, decisionmakers will no doubt differ on the
answer to the mandatory annuitization question
based on their different values about the
importance of each of these costs and benefi t s .
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Benefit 1: Enhanced Annuity Market
E f f i c i e n c y
As discussed earlier in the context of private market
pricing of annuities, insurance markets often suffer
from adverse selection.  Because an annuity pays
income for life, it will be more attractive to indi-
viduals who expect to live a long time and less
attractive to those who suspect that they will not
live a long time.  As a result, in a voluntary annuity
market, individuals who purchase annuities are
likely to have longer life expectancies than those
who do not.  If an insurance company prices
annuities based on the average mortality in the
population as a whole, but only sells them to
individuals who are longer-lived than average, 
then the company will lose money.  To avoid this,
insurance companies must charge more for an
a n n u i t y, or stated differently, must lower the
monthly payout they can provide for a given
annuity premium.  As they raise their price, they
make annuities attractive to fewer and fewer
individuals, thus ÒunravelingÓ the market.2 4 As a
result, annuity transactions that would be mutually
b e n e ficial to the insurance company and the indivi-
dual in the presence of full and symmetric informa-
tion and more detailed pricing do not take place.
Mandatory annuitization forces all risk classes
into the market.  As a result, insurance companies
can price their annuities using average mortality
characteristics.  This outcome serves to lower
prices and/or increase payouts for all individuals
by overcoming the adverse selection problem.  
As noted above, evidence suggests that mandatory
annuitization could increase payouts to individuals
in the United States by up to 10 percent (Mi t c h e l l ,
et al., 1999).
Benefit 2: Decreased Risk of
Individuals Having Inadequate Old
Age Resources
If all individuals had near-perfect information
and behaved rationally, they would all
adequately provide for the contingency of
living to advanced ages.  Unfortunately, due to
factors such as imperfect information about
mortality risk, imperfect annuity markets, and
even myopic behavior on the part of retirees, it
is quite likely that some individuals will fail to
adequately insure themselves against outliving
their resources.  In addition to the personal
costs that running out of money imposes upon
these individuals, there is also a potentially
large public cost in the form of government
assistance programs.  Individuals or couples
whose income falls very low become eligible
for SSI, thus increasing the financial burden
on the public sector.  Mandating a minimum
level of annuitization that provides an income
stream greater than the eligibility level for SSI
ensures that this will not occur.  
Cost 1: Mandate May Over-Annuitize
Some Individuals  
A person may wish not to annuitize for a
number of rational reasons.  For example, he 
or she may have exceptionally strong bequest
motives.  Requiring these individuals to annui-
tize a substantial portion of their retirement
wealth could make them worse off.
Some of these situations are more trou-
bling than others.  For example, two indivi-
duals with strong bequest motives but different
health conditions could face different options.
A very healthy individual can always Òun-doÓ
excessive annuitization and leave a bequest by
using the annuity income to pay the premiums
on a life insurance policy.  Ho w e v e r, this
option may not be available to an individual in
poor health, since he or she may be unable to
qualify for life insurance.  Thus, it is important
that any annuity mandate not be excessive, or
it will be of the most disadvantage to those
individuals who are already Òworse offÓ due to
health considerations.
24 C l e a r l y, if the insurance company could accurately determine
the expected mortality of each individual applicant, it could price
each policy in a manner that was appropriate and profitable. In
practice, life insurance companies estimate mortality for life
insurance contracts, using medical exams and health histories to
separate individuals into risk classes. This estimation is almost
never done for annuity products, however.Cost 2: Redistribution from Poor to Rich
Distributional considerations of an annuity
mandate arise due to heterogeneity in mortality
risk across the population.  Annuities that ignore
individual or group characteristics will result in
expected transfers from high-mortality risk groups
to low-mortality risk groups.  While the extent 
of redistribution is quite sensitive to the precise
structure of the annuity, in some cases it can be
substantial.  Mandating the use of a single life,
inflation-indexed annuity leads to very substantial
transfers from men to women, from blacks to
whites and Hispanics, and from lower education
groups to higher ones.  Research suggests that
black males with less than a high school education
would receive less than 80 cents in lifetime
annuity income per dollar invested in the annuity,
while white women with a college degree would
receive $1.10 per dollar invested (Brown, 2000).
In general, within each gender these transfers tend
to be from economically disadvantaged groups to
groups that are better off fi n a n c i a l l y.   
The size of these expected transfers can be
s i g n i ficantly reduced through the use of joint and
survivor annuities, period certain or refund
options, or by Òfront-loadingÓ annuity payments.
Ho w e v e r, the mechanisms that lessen the extent of
redistribution often do so at the cost of reducing
the income that is available to retirees.  One could
also attempt to offset these distributional outcomes
through the use of an income-based tax or subsidy
system.  For example, low earners, who have
higher mortality rates, could receive a government
match on contributions as a way of increasing
their annuity payment, while higher earners could
pay a tax.  In order to offset the redistribution,
these tax and subsidy rates would have to be set
based on the correlation between income, or
retirement wealth, and mortality.  More research is
needed to accurately quantify this relationship.  
Implications for Pension
Policy
Current policy towards pension plans in the
United States discourages annuitization because
d e fined contribution plans such as 401(k)s are not
required to offer an annuity option.  This fact,
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combined with the other disincentives for doing
so, has resulted in a mere 27 percent of 401(k)
plan participants having access to annuitization
within their pension plan.  While retirees have the
option of withdrawing their funds from the plan
and purchasing an annuity directly from an
insurance company, available evidence suggests
this option is rarely chosen.  
Given the importance of annuitization as a way
of insuring longevity risk, this lack of opportunity to
annuitize within the plan is troubling.  Public policy
could be changed in several ways to encourage
annuitization, ranging from an annuity mandate to
increased education of participants.  The
Department of Labor Advisory Council Wo r k i n g
Group proposed to make annuities the default
distribution option in defined contribution plans.
Plan distributions other than in annuity form would
require the active choice of the plan participant.
Such a plan would probably be quite effective at
increasing annuitization rates while still providing
participants with the freedom to choose an
alternative distribution method.
Some practitioners have argued that ERISAÕ s
Òjoint and survivorÓ requirements are partially
responsible for the scarcity of an annuity option
within DC plans, due to the additional administra-
tive complexity they bring.  Ho w e v e r, policymakers
should be concerned about the income security 
for spouses of pensioners as much as for the
pensioners themselves.  Joint and survivor options, 
by insuring that surviving spouses also have a
guaranteed lifelong income stream, are an impor-
tant component of retirement portfolios.  The
ERISA requirement allows for couples to forgo the
survivor option if both spouses agree, so choice is
preserved.  It does, however, provide a safeguard 
to spouses that may protect them in the case of
w i d o w h o o d .
In summary, policy towards annuitization has
not kept up with the realities of the changing
pension landscape in the United States.  Looking
to the future, defined contribution pension plans
will be the dominant source of retirement wealth
for many households.  As such, if policymakers
wish to encourage annuitization, it is critical that
these households have opportunities to annuitize
their assets within the DC plan.Implications for Social
Security Reform
The existing Social Security system provides an
important source of inflation-indexed longevity
insurance that is currently unavailable in the
private sector.  This insurance is of substantial
value to retired households, but is often ignored 
in discussions of the financial returns available in
the current system.  This omission is unfortunate,
since the benefits of annuitization are an impor-
tant element of any retirement system that seeks 
to provide income security.  
Ho w e v e r, a desire to ensure adequate annuiti-
zation is not inconsistent with support for indi-
vidual accounts proposals, since any individual
accounts system can include a mandatory annuiti-
zation component.2 5 Particularly if individual
accounts are a partial replacement for the existing
Social Security program, it is important that man-
datory annuitization be part of the system.  At a
minimum, individuals should be required to
annuitize enough of their resources so that they
are above the poverty line.  Retirees could then be
free to take any remaining account balance as a
lump sum.
Furthermore, these mandated annuities should
be protected from inflation.  This protection could
be provided directly by the government, as is done
with the current system, or through the private
market.  The availability of Treasury Inflation
Protected Securities should make it possible for
the private market to underwrite an inflation
guarantee, assuming that the U.S. Treasury will
continue to provide an adequate supply of these
bonds in the future.
It is also quite important that any individual
accounts plan provide adequate retirement income
for surviving spouses.  One simple way to achieve
this goal is simply to require that the mandated
annuities be joint and survivor annuities.
Providing such annuities can easily be done by
government or the private sector.  It would be
important, however, to ensure that the level of 
the survivor benefit chosen be sufficient for the
surviving spouse to stay above the poverty line.
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It should also be recognized, however, that
mandatory annuitization has potentially severe
distributional consequences.  This is true in the
existing Social Security system, and would be true
in an individual accounts system as well.  An
important difference, however, is that the current
Social Security system offsets this redistribution
through the use of a progressive benefit structure.
Taken together, the distributional impact of the
existing system appears to be largely neutral.2 6
Many individual accounts proposals, on the other
hand, do not have an offsetting progressive benefi t
structure.  As a result, the distributional effects
can be quite substantial.  
Conclusion
Annuities have an important role to play in
retirement portfolios as a way of insuring that
individuals do not outlive their resources.  From 
a public policy perspective, ensuring access and
utilization of annuity options by retirees is one way
to limit dependence on social assistance programs.
In the United States, the current Social Se c u r i t y
system is the primary, and in many cases the only,
source of annuitization for most households.  If
the private pension system continues to evolve in a
manner that limits opportunities for annuitization,
the inflation-indexed annuity offered by So c i a l
Security will become that much more important 
as a source of longevity insurance.  Given this
importance, proposals that seek to s u p p l e m e n t t h e
existing Social Security program with an individual
accounts system need to ensure that individuals
will have adequate opportunities to annuitize their
wealth.  Proposals that seek to partially r e p l a c e t h e
Social Security system should consider mandatory
annuitization in order to overcome adverse
selection and to guarantee a minimum level of
retirement income for life.  Mandatory annuiti-
zation, however, comes at a cost of redistributing
resources away from economically disadvantaged
groups towards groups that are better off
fi n a n c i a l l y.  Fo r t u n a t e l y, there are policy options
that would help offset this redistribution, such as
contribution matches based on income.  
25 For example, the members of The 1994-96 Advisory Co u n c i l
on Social Security (Òthe Gramlich CommissionÓ) who supported
the ÒIndividual AccountsÓ (IA) proposal recommended that
account balances be paid out through inflation-indexed
a n n u i t i e s .
26 See Liebman (2000) and Coronado, Fullerton and Glass
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